Employer’s Intent to Discriminate Is Not Required Element Under Maine Equal Pay Law

Takeaway: Employers can expect courts to be uniformly unsympathetic to the argument that a plaintiff alleging sex-based pay disparity must prove an intent to discriminate in the face of a state’s equal pay law’s unambiguous statutory language to the contrary. The consensus view of state and federal courts in the U.S. is that discriminatory intent is not a required element of viable wage discrimination claims.

Under Maine’s equal pay law, a plaintiff alleging sex-based pay disparity need not prove intent to discriminate where the acknowledged pay disparity for comparable work was not due to an established seniority system, merit pay system or shift differences, according to the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. An award of more than $180,000 was affirmed against the former employer.

A licensed clinical psychologist brought a sex discrimination action against her former employer, a nonprofit hospital, under federal and state law after learning that two male colleagues in a “pool” of five psychologists were paid nearly twice as much as the plaintiff and their other two female colleagues. She brought the pay disparity to the attention of management. Around this time, the hospital independently became aware of several sex-based pay disparities among hospital employees and initiated an attempt to standardize pay across sexes.

Following unsuccessful attempts by the employee and the hospital to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution, she informed her employer that she planned to resign, citing the differential between her wage and that of her male counterparts. Although she offered to work for two additional weeks to transition her patients, the hospital informed her she should not return to work the following day.

The parties agree that all the pool psychologists possessed the same fundamental qualifications including doctoral degrees and licenses to practice psychology in Maine as well as comparable experience and skills in providing psychological services. The hospital conceded that it did not pay its psychologists differently pursuant to any seniority system, difference in shift or time of day worked, or merit increase system. Instead, it says that a “market-based compensation structure” explained any pay disparity.

The female psychologist alleged that the hospital violated the Maine Equal Pay Law (MEPL) by paying male and female employees different wages for comparable work, that its failure to provide equal pay amounted to sex discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that it committed unlawful retaliation in firing her.  She asked for partial summary judgment only on her MEPL claim, asserting that the undisputed facts established the hospital’s liability under Maine’s equal pay statute. The hospital argued that the statute required a showing of intent to discriminate or alternatively that it should be permitted to raise the affirmative defense that it relied on a reasonable factor other than sex to set these wages.

The district court held the MEPL does not impose an intent requirement on a plaintiff, nor does it permit a defendant to rely on a catch-all affirmative defense, because it explicitly limits affirmative defenses to pay differentials based on seniority, merit, or differences in shift or time of day worked. Further, those who violate the MEPL may be liable for treble damages.

The parties then jointly stipulated dismissal of the Title VII and MHRA claims against the hospital. The court dismissed those claims and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff under the MEPL, awarding her $180,956.

On appeal, the 1st Circuit, parsing MEPL’s statutory language, found it unambiguous. “[T]he only reasonable construction of the MEPL is that liability attaches with proof that employees of one sex are being paid less than employees of another sex for comparable work and comparable jobs, regardless of intent, unless an employer can demonstrate that the disparity stems from … the three listed exceptions—and, even then, only if those excepted practices are not traceable to purposeful sex-based discrimination.”

This reading is reinforced by analogous pay equity statutes from other states, the court noted. “Our holding that discriminatory intent is not a required element of viable wage discrimination claims in Maine conforms with the consensus view of state and federal courts throughout the country.” Adding that its holding is “wholly congruent with overwhelming precedent,” the court said that “to require intent would make Maine’s equal pay statute the nation’s distinct outlier.”

The court rejected the hospital’s claim that its former employee was not entitled to treble damages for unpaid wages accrued while she was paid less than her male colleagues in violation of the MEPL. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s grant of partial motion for summary judgment as well as the damages award of $180,956.

Mundell v. Acadia Hospital Corp., 1st Cir., No. 22-1394 (Feb. 1, 2024).

Rosemarie Lally, J.D., is a freelance legal writer based in Washington, D.C.