Takeaway: Employers should keep job descriptions current and document why physical requirements are essential to a position. A temporary accommodation can be useful, but it should be described and managed as temporary if the employer has not agreed that the employee can perform the job permanently without the requirement. Before ending employment, employers also should confirm that available leave has been exhausted and that no effective accommodation would allow the employee to perform all essential functions.
The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for an employer, holding that a production operator who could not stand through a 12-hour shift or perform other required physical duties was not qualified under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or Title VII.
The ADA requires reasonable accommodation for the known limitations of an otherwise qualified employee with a disability. A qualified employee must be able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.
The plaintiff worked as a production operator at a facility that made carbon-fiber products. The job required employees to set up and operate production equipment, restock materials, and pack, label, and document products. The written job description also required physical activity, including lifting at least 25 pounds overhead, turning, bending, reaching, pulling, walking, and standing for up to 12 hours.
After a workplace slip, the plaintiff experienced back pain and later submitted a doctor’s note asking that she be allowed occasional sitting time because of sciatica flareups. The employer allowed that accommodation for several months. It also maintained, however, that production operators were not supposed to sit during their shifts, and it reminded other employees that only the plaintiff had permission to do so.
The plaintiff later submitted additional medical information stating that she could work seated but could not crawl under equipment. Another note said she needed to sit immediately after standing to change paper and could not crawl on the floor. Her short-term disability paperwork later stated that she could not bend, stoop, kneel, crawl under machines, reach under tables, stand for more than 10 minutes at a time, or lift more than 10 pounds overhead.
The employer placed the plaintiff on medical leave and later terminated her employment. It said she had no foreseeable return-to-work date, could not return without restrictions or with restrictions that could reasonably be accommodated, and had exhausted Family and Medical Leave Act time off and other leave.
After receiving a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff sued for failure to accommodate under the ADA and sex discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer on all claims. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the rulings on failure to accommodate and sex discrimination.
The 8th Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff was not qualified for the production-operator position. The court gave significant weight to the employer’s written job description and its judgment about the job’s requirements. The plaintiff’s own description of the work also confirmed that operating the equipment required standing, bending, squatting, walking, and reaching.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that standing was not essential because the employer had allowed her to sit for several months. A temporary accommodation, the court said, does not concede that the accommodated function is nonessential. Nor did an alleged accommodation for one male co-worker create a triable issue, because the record showed that production operators generally were expected to stand.
The court also held that allowing the plaintiff to sit would not have allowed her to perform all essential functions. At the time of termination, she could not perform several other physical duties listed in the job description, including bending, reaching, and lifting more than 10 pounds overhead. The ADA did not require the employer to eliminate those essential functions.
The plaintiff also argued that she had direct evidence of discriminatory motive. But the court held that motive was not material to her reasonable accommodation claim. The relevant question was whether she could perform the essential functions with a reasonable accommodation, and she could not.
The 8th Circuit reached the same result on the Title VII claim. Because the plaintiff was not qualified for the role under either potentially applicable qualification standard, she could not establish a “prima-facie” case of sex discrimination. The court therefore did not need to address whether a similarly situated male employee was treated more favorably.
The 8th Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
Kendall v. Zoltek Corp., 8th Cir., No. 25-1411 (May 18, 2026).
Nicholas Bennett is an attorney with Duane Morris in Palo Alto, Calif.
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