Ex-Detention Facility Head Proves Discrimination Claims

Takeaway: It is important for HR professionals to understand the laws, regulations and legal standards that will apply in the litigation of employment law cases. It is even more important, however, for them to focus on what is actually going on in a potential termination situation, rather than on whether the employee in question will be able to technically plead and prove a discrimination claim. An HR professional’s judgment that a termination may not be justified, even though evidence of discrimination may not seem strong enough to hold up in court, could keep cases like this from moving forward.

The terminated female head of a state juvenile justice facility in Florida succeeded in race and sex discrimination claims, even though the white and male employees she cited as comparators were not similarly situated in all material respects.

The facility head was terminated because an unusually high number of incidents requiring an officer to call for backup occurred on a day when she was out on medical leave. After a review team’s investigation was complete—but before its report was issued—an assistant department administrator terminated the woman, who had no previous poor performance reviews or reprimands.

The plaintiff sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from terminating employees because of their race or sex. The complaint also brought “other causes of action” that could be inferred from the facts. The basis of the case was that similarly situated white and male employees were treated differently and that the department’s stated reasons for the plaintiff’s termination were pretextual.

For comparator evidence, the plaintiff pointed to a white man and a white woman, both of whom were superintendents of juvenile detention centers involved in incidents that reflected a lack of control or failure to abide by department policies. Neither was terminated. Rather, they received only oral reprimands, were allowed to transfer to different facilities and were granted multiple opportunities to comply with various recommendations for improvement.

As for pretext, the plaintiff presented evidence of the department official’s personal bias against her. Her direct supervisor testified that she believed the termination was based on the administrator’s personal feelings, rather than professional reasons, and she characterized the review team efforts as a “search-and-kill mission” against the plaintiff. At trial, the administrator could not recall the basis for concluding that the plaintiff had engaged in “conduct unbecoming as a public employee.” Nor could the administrator point to another employee fired without negative performance reviews or prior reprimands.

The jury found in favor of the plaintiff under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The department asked the trial court to void the judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not present comparators who were similarly situated in all material respects and therefore failed to satisfy her burden to establish a prima facie case. The department also asserted that the facility head had not properly pleaded her Section 1981 claim.

The trial court rejected the department’s Title VII arguments because the evidence regarding the two comparators was sufficient to establish the discrimination claims and credibility was an issue for the jury. The court also rejected the Section 1981 argument, saying that even if the facility head had not properly pleaded that violation in the first place, a federal civil procedure rule gave the trial court the discretion to allow an amendment to the complaint during the trial. The department appealed.

The ultimate question in a discrimination case is whether there is enough evidence to show that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination. Here, the department focused on whether the plaintiff met the initial burden of production at the prima facie stage, rather than on whether she put forward enough evidence to show that she was fired because of racial discrimination. The jury thought she had done so and the department did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for that conclusion. The verdict thus stands, the appeals court held.

The department also argued that the plaintiff did not adequately plead a race discrimination claim under Section 1981. Again, the department aimed at the wrong target, the 11th Circuit said. The trial court’s order expressly relied on its authority to permit amendments to pleadings under the relevant civil procedure rule. However, the department did not cite that rule on appeal, thus forfeiting the challenge, the appeals court held in affirming the order.

Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 11th Cir., No. 21-13245 (Dec. 12, 2023), petitions for rehearing denied (Feb. 21, 2024).

Margaret M. Clark, J.D., SHRM-SCP, is a freelance writer in Arlington, Va.